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The Czech experience with capital flows:  
challenges for monetary policy 
Luděk Niedermayer and Vít Bárta
1 
1. Introduction 
Capital flows are a crucial factor in macroeconomic and monetary development. Especially in 
a small open economy, they usually have a direct and sizeable impact on the exchange rate 
and, through it, on inflation, competitiveness and economic growth. Should the overall 
macroeconomic framework become internally inconsistent, capital flows become a typical 
channel through which the necessary correction materialises. They thus constitute both the 
channel through which a given macroeconomic setting could be damaged or undermined 
and a useful adjustment mechanism of re-establishing the economic order.  
In this paper, we discuss the experience of the Czech economy with capital flows since the 
beginning of its transformation, which started in 1991. We deal with three different periods 
characterised by substantial volumes of capital flows with significant implications for the way 
monetary policy was implemented. Three different developments were occurring within 
different macroeconomic frameworks, thus having different monetary policy implications. 
Namely, we deal with: (1) the period 1991–95, when the fixed exchange rate and monetary 
targeting were maintained; (2) 1996–99, when the Czech National Bank (CNB) widened the 
fluctuation margin for the koruna and when a speculative attack ultimately led the CNB to 
abandon the fixed exchange rate regime, with negative implications for exchange rate 
volatility; and (3) 2002–03, when the CNB, against the background of a steady appreciation 
trend, faced an appreciation bubble and its subsequent burst. We also briefly discuss a 
potential future challenge for monetary policy consisting in a high share of repatriated profits 
in the current account deficit. This is followed by some remarks concerning the period from 
March to summer 2007, when the Czech foreign exchange market was influenced by “carry 
trades”. Finally, we summarise the Czech experience with capital flows and derive some 
lessons.  
2.  Capital flows under the fixed exchange rate regime: 1991–95 
2.1.  Macroeconomic and monetary background  
2.1.1.  Beginning of economic reform and split of the former Czechoslovakia  
Economic reforms in the Czech Republic started in 1991 after the collapse of the former 
centrally planned system and the disintegration of the former CMEA trade regime. Initial 
reform steps involved: (a) the devaluation of the Czechoslovak koruna in several steps and 
its fixing vis-à-vis a basket of five currencies; (b) the introduction of so-called internal 
convertibility of the koruna (see below); (c) the liberalisation of prices; and (d) the 
liberalisation of foreign trade. In the initial phases of the economic transformation, direct 
                                                  
1  Vít Barta did final editing and made important contributions to a previous version of the article, which was 
based on Ludek Niedermayer’s presentation at a workshop of the National Bank of Romania at the end of 
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policy tools were frequently applied, but these were phased out and replaced by indirect 
market-conforming measures. 
As in other transformation economies, output dropped substantially during 1991–92, but 
started to recover afterwards. During this period, the privatisation process started with the 
aim of generally overhauling property rights in the economy. In 1992, a general tax reform 
introduced a market-conforming tax structure. After the split of former Czechoslovakia, the 
Czech Republic came into being in January 1993 and the Czech koruna in February. In 
subsequent years, the economy recovered and embarked on a path to accelerated growth.  
2.1.2.  Overheating and the emergence of external imbalance  
At first sight, the Czech economy was reasonably healthy
2 in the mid-1990s. Economic 
growth reached almost 7% in 1995 (Figure 1), unemployment was around 4% and inflation 
was around 9% and stable.  
Figure 1 
GDP in the Czech Republic (1994–H1 2006) 
 
Source: Czech Statistical Office. 
As mentioned above, the exchange rate was fixed with the currency peg delivering much 
needed stability to the economy. The overall prospects were considered quite promising.  
However, a closer look showed worrying signs of demand overheating. Growth in real wages 
was exceeding productivity growth, and the gap between both variables reached almost 
12 percentage points in 1995 and was still substantial in 1996 (Figure 2).  
                                                  
2  The problems of the Czech economy during the 1990s related to the inadequacy of its institutional framework, 
the weakness of its law enforcement mechanisms and the consequences of delayed privatisation of the 
banking sector are not discussed in this paper. However, there is no doubt that they negatively influenced the 




















































Real wages and labour productivity in the Czech Republic (1995–2004) 
 
Source: Czech National Bank. 
An unfavourable relationship also existed between domestic demand and supply. Stimulated 
by the fast growth of wages, household demand started to boom and loans to the newly 
fledged private sector expanded robustly. This was partly a consequence of what has been 
called “banking socialism”: government expenditures were directed towards large 
infrastructure projects (many of them in the area of environmental protection) with typically 
low returns. Also, private investments recovered after the decline during the transformation 
recession. The investment boom which took place during 1995–96 implied an exceptionally 
high ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP.  
The resulting mismatch between domestic demand and supply led to the emergence of an 
external imbalance: the current account deficit reached 6.6% of GDP in 1996 and 6.2% in 
1997 (Figure 3), thus exceeding the level generally considered critical (5% of GDP).  
Figure 3 
Trade and current account balance/GDP (1995–2005) 
 
Source: Czech National Bank, own computations. 
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Unfortunately, the macroeconomic policies at the time did not respond to mounting external 
imbalances. The overheating was partly (and mistakenly) considered as the correction of 
previous economic decline. In addition, policymakers believed that the performance in the 
mid-1990s reflected the strengths of the newly formed market economy. Overall, there was 
insufficient understanding of the risks related to a continuing fixed exchange rate regime. The 
consequences of this neglect became obvious when capital flows started to play a more 
important role.  
2.2.  Capital account liberalisation: an invitation to capital inflow 
2.2.1.  From internal to external convertibility in five years 
The internal convertibility of the koruna introduced at the beginning of 1991 was based on 
the following elements:
3  
–  free access of domestic firms to convertible currencies used for trade transactions  
–  obligatory sales of foreign currencies obtained as export revenue  
–  limited access of households to foreign currencies used for individual tourism  
These measures were adopted to cope with the very low level of foreign exchange reserves 
with which the Czechoslovak (Czech) economy was starting its economic transformation. In 
other words, in the light of this low endowment with reserves, internal convertibility was the 
only way to maintain the currency peg.  
While the approach to current account transactions was relatively liberal, capital account 
transactions were more strictly regulated, especially on the outflows side. Although 
repatriation of investment gains (profits, dividends and interest payments) was guaranteed, 
free outflow of short-term portfolio investment by residents was restricted. Some other capital 
account transactions (both outflows and inflows) were either explicitly forbidden or subject to 
a licence system (see Dědek (2000) for more details). A general reason for different outflow 
restrictions was to stimulate inflows of FDI (to support the restructuring and privatisation of 
the government-owned sector) and portfolio investment (to support the development of the 
capital market). The inflow of bank credit was also welcomed due to the fear that domestic 
banks were unable to meet the requirements of the under-invested and growing economy.  
Although the Foreign Exchange Act remained unchanged for several years, the overall legal 
environment and everyday practices were developing towards much higher capital mobility. 
An important interference with the desired framework stemmed from bilateral agreements on 
the protection of foreign investments. These international agreements were superior to 
domestic legal norms and thus undermined the discriminatory approach towards outflows of 
short-term capital as intended by the Foreign Exchange Act. Another channel of erosion of 
capital mobility restrictions was rooted in the banking sector. With the expansion of foreign 
banks (and their branches) and the increasing weight of their transactions (between both 
residents and non-residents), the initial scheme (or “straitjacket”) tailored for taming the 
capital flows was weakening.  
In October 1995, a new Foreign Exchange Act was adopted
4 which confirmed de jure the 
situation which existed de facto in many areas. In other areas it represented significant 
                                                  
3 See  Dědek (2000) for more details.  
4  Further liberalisation of capital flows was stimulated by the Czech Republic’s politically driven entry into the 
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progress towards the liberalisation of capital flows even in the capital account.
5 With just a bit 
of simplification, we can conclude that the overall shift from the internal convertibility of the 
koruna to its external convertibility was finished in about five years.  
2.2.2.  Emergence of the “impossible trinity”  
The completion of capital account liberalisation and the maintenance of the fixed exchange 
rate led to the emergence of the impossible trinity (or the open economy trilemma), the 
extremely problematic parallel existence of: (a) free capital flows, (b) a fixed exchange rate 
and (c) an independent monetary policy.  
The mechanics of the impossible trinity worked ruthlessly in the Czech case, especially when 
the currency obtained the “investment approved” status for more investors:
6 a high interest 
rate differential (see Figure 4) (due to a high inflation differential) in combination with the 
stable exchange rate invited sizeable capital inflows (Figure 5).  
Figure 4 
One-month Pribor and Deutsche Bundesbank official rate during 1993–96 
 
Sources: Eurostat, Czech National Bank. 
Figure 4 shows that the interest rate differential narrowed somewhat during between the 
second half of1993 and 1994 but widened again at the end of 1994, remaining quite 
substantial during 1995–96. Unsurprisingly, the inflow of capital (Figure 5) was very strong 
during this period, thus contributing to an overheating of the economy.  
                                                  
5  Two major remaining restrictions were those on the purchase of real estate by non-residents and the opening 
of banking accounts by residents abroad.  
6  In 1993, the Czech Republic was designated as investment grade. The credibility of the economy (and 
currency) was boosted later on by several factors, such as a stronger reserve position, the above-mentioned 




















































































































































































































Capital flows during 1993–98 (in billions of koruna) 
 
In terms of GDP, net FDI inflows reached 6% in 1998. 
Source: Czech National Bank. 
Maintaining the currency peg required interventions in the forex market (purchase of foreign 
currency for koruna), which led to an increase in the monetary base and monetary 
aggregates. The resulting sterilisation by the central bank led to a steady accumulation of 
foreign exchange reserves (Figure 6) and pushed the interest rates further upwards.  
Figure 6 
“Sources” of foreign exchange reserves of the  
Czech National Bank (in US dollars)  
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Figure 6 shows a very steep increase in foreign exchange reserves (in USD terms) until the 
end of 1995 (the blue shaded area denotes the amount of reserves acquired through 
interventions; later on, specifically in 2002 and 2005, the amount of reserves also increased 
due to absorption of privatisation of revenue). Higher interest rate differentials provided 
further stimuli for capital inflow and completed the vicious circle (Figure 7).  
Figure 7 
Vicious circle of monetary policy during 1993–96  
 
2.3.  Implications of capital flows during 1991–95  
The amount of capital flows was insignificant at the very beginning of transformation when 
the economy was declining and far from being stable. This was irrespective of the fact that 
policymakers adopted some measures to attract foreign capital. The situation stared to 
change after 1993, when growth resumed and the uncertainties related to the split of former 
Czechoslovakia vanished. While FDI and portfolio capital were attracted by newly emerging 
profit opportunities in the real sector, interest-sensitive forms of capital were stimulated by 
the parallel existence of: (a) a high interest rate differential (due to higher domestic inflation 
than abroad); (b) the increasing cross-border mobility of capital (due to a partly spontaneous 
and party intended process of current and capital account liberalisation); (c) the fixed 
exchange rate of the koruna; and (d) a relatively liquid foreign exchange market. Although 
the monetary framework was transforming the capital inflows into foreign exchange reserves, 
it was not efficient enough to prevent further stimulation of domestic demand. 
Macroeconomic tightening and a change of the framework to address the issue of the 
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Exchange rate of the koruna (basket: 65% DEM, 35% USD)
27 May 1997  
Cancellation of fluctuation 
band, introduction of free float 
28 February 1996 
Fluctuation band 
extended to  
+/- 7.5% 
27 September 1992 
Setting of the band for 
the fluctuation of the 
exchange rate of the 
koruna +/- 0.5% 
3.  From the widening of the fluctuation band towards the speculative 
attack: 1996–97  
At the end of 1995, the macroeconomic and monetary situation was on the verge of 
unsustainability. The economy was overheating, the current account was in deficit and 
rapidly deteriorating, and the costs of maintaining the currency peg were growing 
substantially. Stabilisation of the economy (possibly coordinated) became inevitable.  
3.1.  Isolated attempts of the CNB to deal with imbalances  
As the government at the time did not consider the macroeconomic imbalances to be a 
matter for concern, the CNB implemented restrictive policies without any support from 
government policies. As a consequence, the policy response was one-sided and insufficient. 
Although the CNB increased interest rates several times during 1996, overall monetary 
tightening was limited. At the end of February 1996, the CNB widened the fluctuation band of 
the koruna to ±7.5% (from ±0.5%) to impede the inflow of speculative capital. Although 
widening the band introduced more uncertainty to foreign investors and halted the 
accumulation of reserves, the overall stabilisation impact was only partial and the fiscal-
monetary mix remained too loose (or not restrictive enough).  
Figure 8 shows that after the widening of the band, the koruna started to appreciate (vis-à-vis 
the basket of US dollars and Deutsche marks valid until May 1997).
7 
Figure 8 
Exchange rate of the koruna vis-à-vis  















Source: Czech National Bank. 
                                                  
7  After the abolishment of the fluctuation band (in line with an overall orientation of the Czech Republic towards 
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The monetary development clearly had negative side effects on the real economy. The 
appreciation of the currency started to undermine the country’s competitiveness, thus leading 
to the highest trade deficit (in terms of GDP) during the whole transformation period 
(see Figure 3 above). Although the appreciation helped to decrease inflation temporarily, the 
situation was fragile and the economy’s vulnerability increased.  
3.2.  Currency crisis: fast capital outflows and subsequent stabilisation policies  
In early spring 1997, the sentiment on foreign exchange markets started to reverse. In 
February, the koruna reached its appreciation peak, and policymakers’ inability to adopt the 
necessary corrective measures pushed it towards depreciation. The economic prospects 
were deteriorated by sudden worsening of public finances in April. Although the government 
adopted a certain stabilisation package, its credibility and adequacy was questioned by the 
market.  
The koruna came under pressure on the foreign exchange markets during May and was 
exposed to an attack triggered by the problems in Asian foreign exchange markets. The 
foreign exchange regime was not sustained, despite sizeable foreign exchange and money 
market interventions. On 27 May, the CNB abandoned the currency peg and switched to a 
managed float. During June, the koruna depreciated by about 12% against the former central 
parity.  
To stabilise the domestic currency, the CNB increased interest rates dramatically for a short 
period. Although this helped to keep the koruna from further depreciating, it dented economic 
performance by sharpening existing problems in the banking sector (bad loans) and the 
enterprise sector (inter-enterprise arrears) in subsequent months.  
In June, the government adopted the second stabilisation package. It addressed two areas: 
in the macroeconomic area it implemented a fiscal tightening, a wage freeze in the public 
sector and the adoption of an import surcharge to restrict imports. In addition to this short-
term stabilisation, the package addressed the legal, institutional and microeconomic 
bottlenecks of the economy with the aim of boosting supply side performance over the long 
run.  
The macroeconomic restriction (both fiscal and monetary) combined with the restructuring of 
the banking sector
8 was rather robust, and the economy slipped inevitably into recession in 
1997 and 1998 (see Figure 1 above). The subsequent period brought a mixture of bad and 
good news. On the positive side, the external imbalance started to shrink during 1998 and 
1999, reaching substantially lower levels than before 1997. Supply side performance (due to 
intensified competition and progress in the institutional and legal spheres) was improving 
over time, which was reflected in an acceleration of potential output growth after 2000 
(Figure 9).  
                                                  
8  The largest partly state-owned banks were privatised during 1998–2001. New owners started the restructuring 




Growth of potential output according to  
different methodologies (1996–2005)  
 
Source: Czech National Bank. 
In the monetary policy area, a new monetary regime had to be found soon after the 
abolishment of the currency peg. After some discussion, the CNB decided to adopt inflation 
targeting from the beginning of 1998. The rather untidy monetary discretion which prevailed 
in the aftermath of a speculative attack was thus replaced by a consolidated monetary 
framework with transparent and well defined decision-making. In other words, the earlier 
currency anchor was replaced by the inflation anchor which corresponded much better to the 
almost fully liberalised economy. Inflation targeting also improved the transparency of the 
CNB and gradually contributed to the credibility of the currency.  
The post-crisis uncertainty and the negative output gap
9 were the key challenges for the 
conduct of monetary policy. Figure 10 shows the output gap, which reached about 4% of 
GDP in 1999.  
The size of the output gap indicates that the adjustment of the (preceding) disequilibria was 
rather costly. The recessionary pattern of the Czech economy was even more striking 
because no similar development had occurred in the neighbouring transformation 
economies.
10 Also, unemployment started to increase, reaching around 8% Although it was 
not very favourable for those who became unemployed, the macroeconomic development 
benefited from the fact that the higher level of unemployment helped keep wages in check for 
many following years.  
                                                  
9  Obviously, given the way in which the output gap is constructed, this comment reflects an ex post analysis.  
10  For example, Hungary (whose economy slowed in 1995 due to the adoption of an austerity package by Prime 














































































































































































































Output gap (as a percentage of GDP)  
 
Source: Czech National Bank. 
The abolition of the FX rate peg and post-crisis macroeconomic stabilisation led to an 
increase in exchange rate volatility. As can be seen in Figure 11, after depreciating 
throughout 1997 the koruna appreciated quite strongly, supported by the high interest rate 
differential during 1998, but depreciated again in early spring 1999. The relatively fast and 
robust pass-through was thus transformed into more volatile inflation, complicating the 
formation of inflation expectations and the implementation of stabilisation policy based on 
inflation targeting.  
Figure 11 
Exchange rate of the koruna vis-à-vis the euro  
(pre-1999 data obtained from the conversion rate  
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3.3.  Implications of capital flows during 1996–99 
As Figure 11 clearly shows, capital inflows and outflows played a substantial role in the 
exchange rate volatility during 1996–99. The widening of the fluctuation band in February 
1996 was followed by an appreciation which persisted until February 1997. As mentioned 
above, the worsening of market sentiment (driven by macroeconomic disequilibria) turned 
into capital outflows, which implied a depreciation of the koruna. To prevent further capital 
outflows and stabilise the currency after May 1997, interest rates were increased 
dramatically. The combination of a high interest rate differential and a recovery of the 
credibility of the koruna promoted capital inflows, and the currency steadily appreciated 
throughout 1998 until February 1999.
11  
As inflation plummeted during 1998–99, interest rates declined accordingly, implying a 
narrowing of the interest rate differential. The earlier appreciation was followed by a 
correction in February 1999, which partly reflected a declining (but still positive) carry on the 
koruna. In other words, the koruna exchange rate was on a roller coaster during 1996–99, 
with most of the volatility attributable to capital inflows and outflows. For monetary policy, this 
was a new experience.  
Considering the rather high volatility of the currency and the remarkable openness of the 
economy, the stabilisation of inflation became a difficult and challenging task. Figure 12 
indicates a rather close relationship between the koruna exchange rate and adjusted inflation 
(which refers to CPI inflation minus administered prices and food prices) during 1996–98.  
Figure 12 
The exchange rate of the koruna vis-à-vis the euro  
and adjusted inflation during 1994–2006  
 
Sources: Eurostat, Czech National Bank. 
                                                  
11  As Figure 11 shows, the koruna did not reach its pre-crisis level, but was stronger than in the period which 
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4.  Appreciation bubble in 2001–02 
Figures 11 and 12 show that a steady appreciation of the koruna during 2000–06 was 
interrupted by an appreciation bubble in 2002 and its subsequent burst. First, we deal briefly 
with the trend towards appreciation and then with the exchange rate bubble. We investigate 
the role of capital flows in each case.  
4.1.  Trend appreciation and the sterilisation scheme 
The appreciation trend starting around 2000 was driven by steadily increasing productivity 
gains (the Balassa-Samuelson effect) related to an advanced stage of microeconomic 
restructuring. As illustrated by Figure 9, productivity growth translated into an acceleration of 
sustainable growth.  
In addition, the appreciation of the koruna was fostered by future appreciation expectations 
derived from accelerating sales of many large government-owned companies (announced by 
the government to occur from 2000 onwards). In order to offset potentially damaging 
appreciation pressures stemming from the sales of big blocks of government assets, the 
government adopted a special sterilisation scheme (developed by the CNB) which was 
supposed to isolate the impact of these sales on the foreign exchange market.
12 The 
adoption of the scheme in January 2002 was justified by the fact that the observed 
appreciation was occurring at a time when no inflow of short-term debt capital was 
registered. Thus, the expectations of future capital flows, rather than actual flows, were 
behind part of the appreciation. Policymakers’ intention to adopt the sterilisation scheme (to 
face current expectations and future capital flows) was also justified by the assumption that 
the standard tool (interest rates) would hardly be efficient when dealing with flows unrelated 
to interest rate differentials.  
4.2.  Exchange rate “bubble” 
The appreciation bubble starting at the end of 2001 and peaking in July 2002 was driven by 
both expectations and actual capital flows. Below, we examine the sentiment in the foreign 
exchange market and the capital flows as recorded by the capital account of the balance of 
payments.  
4.2.1.  Development in the foreign exchange market  
During the first four months of 2002, the koruna steadily appreciated as a consequence of 
persisting investment inflows and positive market sentiment. The rate of appreciation, 
however, was out of step with economic fundamentals, so the CNB decided to intervene in 
the market several times, both verbally and via forex interventions. With the fall in expected 
inflation, the Bank also lowered interest rates multiple times (see Figure 13). The 
appreciation sentiment in the market was fairly strong at the time, however, and the CNB’s 
interventions failed to have any long-term effect on the koruna. There was moderate 
stabilisation in the middle of the year, when the appreciation trend halted, after the koruna hit 
a historical high of EUR/CZK 28.9.
13 This was attributable to covert interventions, through 
                                                  
12  The purpose of the scheme was to counteract the underlying market expectations that a sizeable increase in 
privatisation proceeds will sooner or later be converted on the foreign exchange market.   
The proposed approach was based on the assumption that the best solution is to keep the   
privatisation revenues (and other foreign exchange revenues of the government, eg from the de-blocking 
of its foreign receivables) to the maximum extent possible on a foreign exchange account at the   
CNB or to use them without the need for conversion into koruna. See 
www.cnb.cz/en/monetary_policy/strategic_documents/download/vlada_cnb_kurz_en.pdf for details.  
13  The level was not reached before end-2005.  198  BIS Papers No 44
 
 
which the central bank succeeded in keeping the market in suspense. A sharp reduction in 
key rates (of 75 basis points in July) also had a psychological effect. This took the rates 
below those of the ECB.  
Figure 13 
Two-week repo rates of the ECB and the CNB  
 
Source: Eurostat. 
After a swing in August linked to the uncertain impacts of floods, the exchange rate of the 
koruna set off on a downward course. Acting against the domestic currency were large 
foreign trade deficits (reported by the Czech Statistical Office), a negative interest rate 
differential against other central European currencies (bolstered by a further 25 basis point 
reduction in CNB rates at the end of October) and, at the end of the year, a sharp weakening 
of the dollar. Owing to the action of market forces and an easing of speculative pressures, in 
October the CNB stopped intervening directly in the foreign exchange market. Looking at the 
year as a whole, then, the koruna started 2002 at EUR/CZK 31.65 and with a strong 
appreciation trend, but a turnaround in that trend in the second half meant that it ended the 
year essentially unchanged, at EUR/CZK 31.60.  
4.2.2.  Financial account of the balance of payments  
The financial account for 2002 recorded a net inflow of foreign capital of CZK 340.3 billion 
(EUR 11.0 billion), almost twice the previous year’s figure. The largest inflow was traditionally 
from foreign direct investment. The total volume of FDI increased by around CZK 60 billion to 
a record CZK 276.1 billion (EUR 9.0 billion), thanks to high privatisation revenues. The ratio 
of FDI to GDP exceeded 10%. The year-on-year increase of 22.3% was due in particular to 
the sale of Transgas, to RWE of Germany. Adjusted for the state’s sale of Transgas and the 
purchase of 40% of Česká spořitelna’s
14 shares, the investment inflow was fairly even across 
the individual quarters of the year (between CZK 25 billion and CZK 28 billion), apart from in 
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the third quarter, when there was an increase in purchases of corporate interests by foreign 
investors.  
Portfolio investment recorded a net outflow of CZK 46.7 billion (EUR 1.5 billion) in 2002. 
Compared to 2001, when a net inflow of CZK 34.9 billion had been recorded, that means a 
turnaround in financial flows of CZK 81.6 billion. This was chiefly due to domestic banks, 
which converted a large proportion of their assets held in the form of short-term deposits into 
portfolio investment holdings. The largest outflow of portfolio investment occurred in Q4 2002 
(CZK 53.5 billion) (see Figure 14), when domestic banks on balance invested 
CZK 34.8 billion in foreign bonds and there was a simultaneous decline in investment by 
foreign investors in domestic bonds. In the third and fourth quarters, the interest of foreign 
investors in Czech debt securities steadily waned. Foreign investors’ behaviour was arguably 
linked to the evolution of the interest rate differential and the expected exchange rate of the 
koruna, as well as to the availability of more lucrative investments in neighbouring countries 
such as Poland and Hungary,
15 on a cost of carry basis. 
Figure 14 
Financial account during 2001–03  
 
Source: Czech National Bank. 
Other investment showed a net inflow of funds of CZK 122.0 billion (around EUR 4 billion). 
As compared to the previous year, when this item had recorded a net outflow of around 
CZK 67.1 billion, this represents a sharp change in the direction of financial flows. The inflow 
of capital into the Czech Republic started in the first quarter and steadily gathered pace, 
especially in Q4 (see Figure 14). Domestic banks accounted for much of this inflow 
(CZK 115.5 billion). During the course of the year they gradually withdrew their short-term 
assets from foreign banks (total fall in short-term deposits: CZK 97.9 billion) and steadily 
decreased their short-term credit exposure to non-residents.  
                                                  
15  There was also anecdotal evidence that some of the investors used the koruna as a financing currency for 
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4.3.  Implications of capital flows during 2001–02  
Capital flows became an important factor in exchange rate development during 2001–02. 
The combination of: (a) an unprecedented inflow of FDI related to large sales of government 
assets; (b) expectations of further inflows; and (c) speculative flows of capital driven by 
expectations of koruna appreciation inflated the exchange rate bubble during the first half of 
2002. The adoption of the sterilisation scheme by the government and the CNB in 
combination with a series of exchange rate cuts (supplemented by other negative news from 
the real economy) probably supported a gradual reversal of sentiment in the foreign 
exchange market and brought the koruna’s exchange rate back towards its fundamentals. 
However, it took some time before the correction depreciated the currency, so the costs of 
this episode for the economy were not negligible. Appreciation of the currency translated into 
deflation in 2003, which lasted about eight months. An unexpected decline in inflation led to 
an increase in real wages, which implied an increase in household consumption and 
somewhat higher volatility in the GDP during 2003.  
5.  2007 experience with carry trades 
As seen in Figure 15, short-term interest rates have become significantly lower than those in 
other markets. The gap was widened by the start of the monetary tightening by many central 
banks. As result, investments in koruna-denominated fixed income instruments lost their 
attraction, but at the same time, financing in the currency became “cheap” in nominal terms. 
Figure 15 
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Since 2006, many market participants have started to talk about the growing use of the 
koruna as a financing currency in carry trades. There was rather weak evidence of this from 
statistics, which were not showing any large swings in the position of the domestic banks 
with non-residents, or from the forex market, where the currency kept its trend and 
maintained a positive correlation with the regional currencies. 
Figure 16 
Exchange rates of selected currencies in 2007  
 
Source: Eurostat. 
As seen in Figure 16, since March 2007 there has been a significant change in trends, and 
the koruna has started to depreciate slowly but continuously. Instead of being positively 
correlated with currencies from the region, the koruna has begun to follow other “nominally 
cheap” currencies like the yen or the Swiss franc. The abrupt end of this trend was clearly 
related to the closing of carry trade positions in the summer of 2007, when overall risk 
aversion and risk assessment changed. Over a very short period, the Czech currency offset 
all its losses and got back to its “usual” appreciation path. 
Backward checking of the data does not reveal the whole story or the size of the carry trade 
market in koruna. The change of the net position of domestic banks vis-à-vis non-residents 
was not large enough to account for the move. It was partly due to the off-balance sheet 
nature of many carry trade deals. Indeed, the growth of derivatives, which could be used for 
carry trades, was much higher in the spring of 2007 (20% versus 6.5% a year earlier), but 
still it does not give a clear evidence of the size of the money flow (or rather exposure flow) 
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6.  Challenges ahead – dealing with a floating currency in a 
liberalised market? 
Over the last two years, the koruna enjoyed a period of a relatively low volatility and a 
continuation of the former appreciation trend. On average, the currency appreciated by 
almost 5% in 2006. In this environment, the CNB repeatedly undershot its inflation target, 
with interest rates well bellow those of the ECB. Understandably, this situation is challenging 
for monetary policy. Should there be reasonable certainty that the average yearly 
appreciation will be around 3–4%, it would be possible to incorporate this assumption into the 
inflation forecast.
16 This would reduce the risk that the interest rates set by the CNB would be 
too high in the future. Surprises on the appreciation side and undershooting of the inflation 
target would be less likely.
17 
There are several ways to deal with this problem. First, the equation can be changed in such 
a way as to reflect future developments to a great extent. This places less weight on 
economic theory (UIP, etc) and more on past experience. Obviously, in the case of 
successful incorporation of the trend appreciation into the model, the problem is how to 
distinguish short-term deviations of the currency from the trend (like the episode mentioned 
in Section 5) from a possible “appreciation bubble”, which could lead to a large forecasting 
error and a possible surge in inflation. The second way is to focus more on the forecast of 
risks related to uncertainty concerning the future path of the exchange rate. This is easier, 
but depending on a variety of scenarios it could lead to very unclear signals being derived 
from the forecast.  
At the end of the day, the likelihood of continued appreciation matters very much for 
monetary policy. And was shown above, in recent years this has been more a question of 
market expectations than of capital flows. The question therefore arises as to how robust 
those expectations are. 
From the point of view of stability of expectations, the balance of payments is one of the key 
variables. Despite the recent improvement of the trade balance, there is an issue of 
consistency of appreciation expectations with the balance of payment forecast, especially 
from the point of view of the investment position of the Czech Republic.  
Foreign assets account for around 25% of GDP, and liabilities are in the range of 50%. But 
while the assets are mainly in the form of foreign exchange reserves at the CNB (yielding a 
low rate of interest),
18 FDI (which represents the majority of debit items) generates returns in 
multiples of yields on assets.
19  
                                                  
16  Within the current forecasting framework, the main problem stems from the equation based on both UIP and 
the equilibrium speed of appreciation, which systematically underestimate the pace of appreciation in recent 
years.  
17  Estimates for FX pass-through are around ⅓, so the impact of the stronger currency on inflation can be 
substantial. 
18  Reserves are invested mainly in high-grade government bonds and bank deposits. As a consequence, yields 
depend on market conditions in the range of 2–5%. 
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Source: Czech National Bank. 
Figure 18 
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The data show that despite an impressive improvement in the trade balance and surpluses in 
other components, the growing negative balance of income (currently 5% of GDP) will be 
pushing the current account towards a deficit in the future. 
It could be argued that the part of the income balance deficit is “going back” through 
reinvested earnings of the financial account (between ⅓ and ⅔ in recent years), but this 
simply means that the negative investment position will further deteriorate, and the problem 
in income balance will be shifted into the future. 
7. Lessons 
Since the beginning of its transformation, the Czech economy has accumulated a large body 
of experience with capital flows. During 1990–93, capital flows were still unsignificant due to 
relatively strict regulation of capital mobility and low overall credibility of the economy. 
However, step by step deregulation, accompanied by a spontaneous erosion of regulatory 
arrangement, enhanced capital flow volumes. The macroeconomic and monetary framework 
in the first half of the 1990s was highly conducive to large capital inflows. A fixed exchange 
rate combined with high interest rate differentials became irresistible for foreign investors, 
and in the middle of the 1990s the economy was trapped by the impossible trinity. Although 
the sizeable capital inflows were sterilised by the CNB, they contributed to the overheating of 
the economy and the emergence of large current account deficits. The maintenance of the 
fixed exchange rate thus translated the capital inflows into domestic demand and the 
expansion of the central bank’s foreign currency reserves.  
The widening of the exchange rate band partially helped to solve the puzzle of the impossible 
trinity. Although the risks of investing in domestic assets increased, ongoing capital inflows 
translated into an appreciation of the koruna (rather than to an accumulation of reserves 
under the previous regime). This undermined the competitiveness of exporters and 
contributed to the slowdown of economic growth. A quite alarming worsening of economic 
fundamentals at the beginning of 1997 reversed market sentiment, and the assessment of 
the Czech economy by foreign investors. Earlier capital inflows turned to outflows partly as a 
consequence of the South Asian currency crises in 1997.  
The currency attack of May 1997 terminated the fixed exchange rate period and initiated the 
period of managed float (and inflation targeting since 1998) characterised at first by 
increased exchange rate volatility (and inflation). During 1997–99, the koruna depreciated 
(1997), appreciated (1998) and depreciated (1999), by around 10% on a year-on-year basis 
in each case.  
The overall assessment of the developments during the 1990s is that Czech policymakers 
underestimated the impact of capital flows in a gradually liberalised economy, the trends 
towards overheating and external imbalance, and the risks related to the impossible trinity. 
The fixed exchange rate regime in 1996 was not supported by other policies (when the 
economy was facing growing imbalances), and the very abolishment of the peg was the 
consequence of the currency crisis rather than of a wise policy decision.  
The managed float regime has brought new challenges: while high exchange rate volatility
20 
makes inflation more volatile (than was the case under the fixed exchange rate), the trend 
appreciation of the koruna has tended to keep the level of inflation below the CNB inflation 
target over time.  
                                                  
20  By maintaining that low exchange rate volatility should be a focus of policymakers, we do not mean that 
currency floating should be restricted, or even replaced, by any kind of fixed exchange rate regime.  BIS Papers No 44  205
 
 
Conducting monetary policy in such an environment is not an easy task. Based on standard 
know-how, the exchange rate forecast would often be too weak, the inflation forecast too 
high and interest rates thus higher than optimal. Undershooting the inflation target is the 
likely outcome. Incorporating more currency appreciation, empirically observed most of the 
time, into the forecast is not a trivial matter either, if transparency is required. Among other 
problems, this approach could be considered by market participants as a support for the 
central bank for the “hard currency policy”, and can thus bring even more currency 
appreciation and eventually more volatility of the economy.  
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